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The impact of administrative costs on the distribution of terminal wealth is approximated using a simple formula applicable to
many investment situations. We show that the reduction in median returns attributable to administrative fees is usually at least
twice the amount of the administrative costs charged for most investment funds, when considering a risk-adjustment correction
over a reasonably long-term time horizon. The example we present covers a number of standard cases and can be applied to
passive investments, mutual funds, and hedge funds. Our results show investors the potential losses they face in performance
due to administrative costs.
1. Introduction and Motivation
The administrative costs of saving and pension schemes have
received increasing attention in recent years, at a time when
a massive shift has been witnessed from actively to passively
managed funds—often exchange-traded funds (ETFs)—that
incur lower costs. The reason is obvious. Most studies of
the performance of actively managed funds are unable to
demonstrate their higher performance [1–3]. Mutual fund
administrative fees are all expenses levied by a fund on its
investors, covering investment management, administration,
servicing, custody, and accounting services, among others
[4]. OECD [5] recommends the promotion of low-cost
retirement savings investments because of the huge impact
of fee levels in terms of reductions in benefits for long
contribution periods.
In this paper we show that the impact of administrative
costs on terminal wealth can be substantial.We also propose a
simplemethod for comparingmedian returns in the presence
and absence of such costs, holding risk constant, and report
that, for certain investment strategies, administrative fees can
at times be twice as high as returns.Median values as opposed
to expectations are used because the instrument we employ is
the value-at-risk measure (i.e., quantiles).
While a good historical performance has been reported
for a few actively managed funds, it is by no means straight-
forward to prove that this performance is anything but a
random phenomenon (see, among others, [6, 7]). Let us
assume for the time being that many savers want to avoid
incurring additional administrative fees, especially if they are
not certain of a higher performance.
When calculating the consequences of extra costs, a stan-
dard approach is used to employ a deterministic prediction
of expected loss on returns, which is the difference between
the expected returns on terminal wealth with andwithout the
extra administrative costs. This is often sufficient to demon-
strate the impact of administrative fees. A typical calculation,
for example, might show that an additional one percent cost
will mean that a quarter of a saver’s pension disappears. This
paper shows that while such calculations are highly thought
as provoking, theymaywell be overly conservative, given that
the saver may well incur costs greater than one percent. The
difference between the expected returns on terminal wealth
without administrative costs and with them is an estimate
of only part of the impact, because extra costs influence the
whole distribution of terminal wealth, not only first-order
moments or location measures. This paper further examines
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this difference and provides a simple analytic expression for
calculating the risk-adjusted impact of administrative costs
on the median returns of terminal wealth. A deterministic
prediction such as the difference between the expected or
median returns of terminal wealth in the presence and
absence of additional administrative costs fails to take the
saver’s risk aversion into account. It is tacitly assumed that the
saver takes the same level of risk with or without these extra
costs. Yet, we know that this is not the whole story. If a saver
loses a quarter of his pension, then he will tend to be more
risk averse with his remainingmoney; he will not want to lose
much more. As such, a pension saver paying one percent in
additional fees will tend to approach risky investments with
more care than a saver who is not being charged these extra
costs—this insight runs contrary to most descriptions in the
literature. Another way of understanding this behaviour is in
terms of a lost opportunity: the saver loses the opportunity to
take riskswith the one percent extra costs that he is apparently
not prepared to lose. Such risky positions, however, give
bettermedian returns than less risky positions. As a result, the
lost opportunity hits hard. We tacitly assume that greater risk
implies better median returns and that greater risk implies
that our risk measure reacts in the “right” direction. We use
a simple quantile as our downside risk measure and we make
the above assumptions explicit in our parameter space.
2. Background
Many authors have studied optimal consumption-investment
problems [8–13]. Performance in terms of stochastic domi-
nance has also been investigated. For instance, Huang et al.
[2] find that funds that shift risk perform worse than those
that maintain risk levels stable over time. They conclude that
agency problems account for this behaviour; that is, fund
managers are more interested in strategically shifting their
risk levels to attract additional fund inflows than they are
in concentrating on strategic investment. The authors use
a holdings-based measure that they define as the difference
between a fund’s current holdings volatility and its past real-
ized volatility. However, the standard deviation of the fund’s
actual return is a poor risk measure (see, for instance, [14])
that treats gains and losses symmetrically. Schuhmacher and
Eling [15] analyze frequently used risk-based performance
measures.
Many authors examine performance but do not focus
on administrative costs [16–19]. Other costs paid by the
investors, such as the price of an interest guarantee on with-
profit policies, have been measured in terms of lost returns
[20]. Cavenaile et al. [21] analyze the impact of illiquidity in
hedge fund returns on their risk-adjusted performance and
diversification potential. Eling [22] finds different levels of
performance persistence in hedge funds, the results depend-
ing on the statistical methodology employed. The need to
account for costs in long-term investments is, however,
implicitly accepted [23, 24]. Costs associated to mortality-
linked funds have been also investigated [25].
When studyingmutual fund administrative fees, Khorana
et al. [4] find that fees can vary substantially across funds
and from country to country. They also show that larger
funds tend to charge lower fees. Choi et al. [26] report
that competition has not eliminated high-fee funds and that
fees paid decrease with the financial literacy of the investor.
Interestingly, subjects who choose high-fee funds feel they are
making amistake. Bergstresser et al. [27] quantify the benefits
that investors purchasing mutual funds enjoy in exchange for
the fees paid to brokers. All these studies serve to motivate
the contribution reported here, that is, a proposal for a simple
tool that can quantify the impact of administrative fees on
performance while taking into account risk adjustment and
long-term time horizons.
For lifetime investors, the importance of performance and
transparency of pension schemes is widely recognized [28–
31]. Small deviations in performance can become massive
as a result of the long-term factor. Pension savers engage
with their retirement savings for long periods of time,
often over several decades. Current performance evaluation
methods are usually too myopic and overlook persistence in
performance, that is, the role played by time.
3. The Model
We assume a simple price process. Consider a Black-Scholes
financial market, that is, a market with a constant risk-free
rate of interest 𝑟 and stock index (𝑆
𝑡
) following a geometric
Brownian motion:
𝑑𝑆
𝑡
𝑆
𝑡
= 𝜇𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑑𝑊
𝑡
, (1)
where 𝜇 is the expected return, 𝜎 is the volatility, and𝑊 is a
standard Brownian motion.
Let 𝑋 denote a wealth process and assume that wealth is
invested at a constant proportion 𝛼 in stocks and the rest at
the risk-free rate. Assume further that administration costs
are deducted continuously from the wealth process with a
rate of ] proportional to the amount invested in risky assets.
We therefore consider administrative costs (particularly, for
custodial and accounting services) to be given by 𝛼]. The
dynamics of𝑋 are thus given by
𝑑𝑋
𝑡
𝑋
𝑡
= 𝛼
𝑑𝑆
𝑡
𝑆
𝑡
+ (1 − 𝛼) 𝑟𝑑𝑡 − 𝛼]𝑑𝑡
= 𝑟𝑑𝑡 + 𝛼 (𝜇 − 𝑟 − ]) 𝑑𝑡 + 𝛼𝜎𝑑𝑊
𝑡
.
(2)
The wealth process is a geometric Brownian motion with
the well-known representation:
𝑋
𝑡
= 𝑋
0
exp [(𝛼 (𝜇 − 𝑟 − ]) + 𝑟 − 1
2
𝛼
2
𝜎
2
) 𝑡 + 𝛼𝜎𝑊
𝑡
] . (3)
Assume for ease of notation that 𝑋
0
≡ 1. More realistic
conditions, including more general price processes with
variance jumps or distributions with heavier tails, might be
considered in the future. It could be argued that the stock
price dynamics in our models are too simple to capture
long-term effects. However, our aim is to study the model
presented here first and, at a later date, to check the robustness
of our results in more sophisticated settings. Additionally,
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wealth distributionmay include the present value of pensions
and future social security benefits together with some other
forms of wealth. However, pension wealth is not perfectly
fungible and some other household assets may also have
liquidity constrains. Besides, differential tax treatment may
also be applicable. Our approach does not consider this more
general framework.
3.1. Quantiles. Since 𝑊
𝑡
D
= √𝑡𝑈, where 𝑈 is a standard
normal variate, it follows that the 𝛾-percentile, 𝑞
𝛾,𝑡
, in the
distribution of𝑋
𝑡
is given by
𝑞
𝛾,𝑡
= 𝑞
𝛾
(𝛼, 𝜇, 𝜎, 𝑟, ], 𝑡)
= exp [(𝛼 (𝜇 − 𝑟 − ]) + 𝑟 − 1
2
𝛼
2
𝜎
2
) 𝑡 + 𝛼𝜎√𝑡𝑑
𝛾
] ,
(4)
where 𝑑
𝛾
denotes the 𝛾-percentile of a standard normal
distribution.
Specifically, the median is given by
𝑚(𝛼, 𝜇, 𝜎, 𝑟, ], 𝑡) = exp [(𝛼 (𝜇 − 𝑟 − ]) + 𝑟 − 1
2
𝛼
2
𝜎
2
) 𝑡] .
(5)
We define the (geometric) rate of return
𝜌 (𝛼, 𝜇, 𝜎, 𝑟, ]) = 𝛼 (𝜇 − 𝑟 − ]) + 𝑟 −
1
2
𝛼
2
𝜎
2
, (6)
such that 𝑚 = exp(𝜌𝑡). From (6), we can see that, given 𝛼, 𝑟,
𝜇, and 𝜎2 fixed, the rate of return (𝜌) is equal to a constant
minus the administrative costs 𝛼].
Note that, even in the absence of administrative costs, the
rate of return is negative for sufficiently large values of 𝛼.
The expected value of𝑋
𝑡
, E[𝑋
𝑡
] = exp[(𝛼(𝜇−𝑟−])+𝑟)𝑡],
is always increasing in 𝛼. This reflects the fact that for high
equity exposures the wealth distribution is highly skewed, the
majority of the mass being close to zero and a long right tail.
Given the skewness of the wealth distribution, here we
prefer to compare medians rather than means.
3.2. Parameter Space Restrictions. Our model parameters
are 𝛼, 𝜇, 𝜎, 𝑟, 𝑡 and the quantile level is 𝛾. We restrict our
parameter space to those parameters for which the median
increases and the 𝛾-percentile decreaseswhen exposure to the
risky asset increases.
The reason why we restrict our parameter space to this
combination is to ensure that our assumptions are realistic.
An increase in the median return is a necessary reward when
downside risk increases in the distribution of 𝑋
𝑡
. Thus, we
assume that any risk-averse saver will only increase their
exposure to the risky assets if the median return increases.
We consider this restriction natural. Besides this property, we
only consider nonnegative administrative costs (]). All details
are provided in Appendix A.
Example 1. For illustrative purposes, we present an example
that we discuss in detail in the sections that follow.We use the
capital market parameters 𝑟 = 4%, 𝜇 = 8%, and 𝜎 = 20%. We
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Figure 1:The plot shows ln(𝑞
𝛾,𝑡
)/𝑡 as a function of 𝑡 in our example.
Parameters are 𝑟 = 4%, 𝜇 = 8%, 𝜎 = 20%, ] = 0%, and 𝛼 = 50%.We
set 𝛾 = 10% (solid), 5% (dashed), 1% (dotted), and 0.1% (mixed).
also assume that 𝛼 = 50% is invested in stocks and that ] = 0,
so there are no administrative costs.
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of quantiles over time for
some values of the probability level; that is, 𝛾 = 10%, 5%, 1%
and 0.1%.We plot ln(𝑞
𝛾,𝑡
)/𝑡 so we have amonotonic transfor-
mation of the quantile (log-scale of (4) divided by 𝑡).
Figure 1 shows that ln(𝑞
𝛾,𝑡
)/𝑡 is negative in the initial
period. Values of ln(𝑞
𝛾,𝑡
)/𝑡 measure the loss in the lowest
quantiles and capture the value-at-risk for the worst possible
scenarios of the wealth process. After forty years, ln(𝑞
𝛾,𝑡
)/𝑡 is
clearly above zero, indicating that initial wealth has increased
even for a situation that is at the 5% level of the downside tail.
In our example, all the conditions of the parameter space
are satisfied for a time horizon of less than a hundred years.
4. Constant Risk of Terminal Wealth
Weare interested in studying the effect of administrative costs
on the median rate of return when fixing the level of risk in
thewealth distribution. (A similar procedure could be applied
to evaluate the effect of administrative costs on the expected
rate of return.)The level of risk in the wealth distribution can
be measured by a (low) percentile in the distribution, that is,
a value-at-risk (VaR) measure.
Our procedure for analysing the impact of administrative
costs is based on a constant risk factor. Thus, we examine the
case for which we have no administrative fees, ] = 0, and
calculate a risk measure for the distribution of wealth at time
𝑡. Then, we determine the equity exposure in the presence
of administrative costs, ] > 0, that corresponds to the same
risk as the given equity exposurewith no administrative costs.
Hence, we seek to find the reduction in equity exposure,
Δ ], such that the 𝛾-percentile of the wealth distribution
with equity exposure 𝛼 − Δ ] and administrative costs ],
𝑞
𝛾
(𝛼 − Δ ], 𝜇, 𝜎, 𝑟, ], 𝑡), matches the 𝛾-percentile of the wealth
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distribution with equity exposure 𝛼 and no administrative
costs 𝑞
𝛾
(𝛼, 𝜇, 𝜎, 𝑟, 0, 𝑡).
Thus, we seek Δ ], such that
𝑞
𝛾
(𝛼 − Δ ], 𝜇, 𝜎, 𝑟, ], 𝑡) = 𝑞𝛾 (𝛼, 𝜇, 𝜎, 𝑟, 0, 𝑡) . (7)
According to (4), we obtain the equivalent relation:
((𝛼 − Δ ]) (𝜇 − 𝑟 − ]) + 𝑟 −
1
2
(𝛼 − Δ ])
2
𝜎
2
) 𝑡
+ (𝛼 − Δ ]) 𝜎√𝑡𝑑𝛾
= (𝛼 (𝜇 − 𝑟) + 𝑟 −
1
2
𝛼
2
𝜎
2
) 𝑡 + 𝛼𝜎√𝑡𝑑
𝛾
,
(8)
which after simple manipulations yields the quadratic equa-
tion:
𝐴Δ
2
] + 𝐵Δ ] + 𝐶 = 0, (9)
where𝐴 = 𝜎2/2, 𝐵 = (𝜇 − 𝑟 − ]) − 𝛼𝜎2 +𝜎𝑑
𝛾
/√𝑡, and 𝐶 = ]𝛼.
It immediately follows from (A.4) that 𝐵2 − 4𝐴𝐶 ≥ 0. So,
there is a solution for Δ ], and it is given by
Δ ] = −
𝐵 − √𝐵
2
− 4𝐴𝐶
2𝐴
. (10)
The other root, −(𝐵 + √𝐵2 − 4𝐴𝐶)/2𝐴, corresponds to
negative equity exposures.
Example 1 (continued). Figure 2 presents our example log-
scale quantile divided by 𝑡 as a function of 𝛼 and the
corresponding quantile when there are administrative costs.
The graph shows that the level of investment in stocks 𝛼 =
50% shifts to the left if we consider 𝛾 = 10% and ] =
0.1%. This means that when administrative costs exist, an
investment equivalent in terms of our risk measure to one
that has 50% invested in stocks and no administrative costs
has a lower proportion invested in stocks, Δ ] = 2.38%, for
𝑡 = 40.
5. Rate of Return
Let 𝜌] be the rate of return with administrative costs ] and
exposure 𝛼 − Δ ]. It follows immediately from (6) that the
difference between the rate of return 𝜌 and 𝜌] is given by
𝜌 − 𝜌] = 𝛼] + Δ ] (𝜇 − 𝑟 − ]) +
1
2
Δ
2
]𝜎
2
− 𝛼Δ ]𝜎
2
. (11)
From the defining equation (8), it holds that
𝛼] + Δ ] (𝜇 − 𝑟 − ]) +
1
2
Δ
2
]𝜎
2
− 𝛼Δ ]𝜎
2
=
−Δ ]𝜎𝑑𝛾
√𝑡
, (12)
and we therefore arrive at the simple expression:
𝜌 − 𝜌] =
−Δ ]𝜎𝑑𝛾
√𝑡
. (13)
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Figure 2:The plot shows ln(𝑞
𝛾,𝑡
)/𝑡 as a function of 𝛼 in our example,
where 𝑡 = 40. Parameters are 𝑟 = 4%, 𝜇 = 8%, 𝜎 = 20%, and
𝛾 = 10%. We compare ] = 0% (solid) with ] = 0.1% (dotted).
The horizontal dotted line indicates the value of ln(𝑞
0.1,40
)/40 when
𝛼 = 50% and ] = 0%.
In (13), as 𝑑
𝛾
is negative, the reduction in the rate of return
is positive. Given our assumptions, it is not surprising that
the inclusion of administrative costs brings a reduction in
the geometric rate of return (note that the geometric rate of
return is based on the median of the wealth distribution) for
𝑋
𝑡
. However, note that Δ ] depends on 𝑡. As a consequence,
the reduction in the rate of return attributable to administra-
tive costs does not necessarily tend to zero as 𝑡 increases. In
certain specific cases, it might be constant, but in general it is
increasing in 𝑡.
In order to understand expression (13) we need to find a
simple first-order approximation.This should enable us to see
the dependence of 𝜌 − 𝜌] on 𝑡 or its rate of convergence to a
constant as a function of 𝑡.
5.1. First-Order Taylor Expansion of Lost Rate of Return. Our
aim is to examine the behaviour of the reduction in the rate
of return as a function of ]. We derive a second-order Taylor
expansion of Δ ] at ] = 0. Since by definition Δ 0 = 0 we have
Δ ] =
𝜕Δ ]
𝜕]
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨]=0
] +
1
2
𝜕
2
Δ ]
𝜕]2
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨]=0
]2 + 𝑜 (]2) . (14)
Differentiating (12) with respect to ] yields
(𝛼 − Δ ]) +
𝜕Δ ]
𝜕]
(𝜇 − 𝑟) + Δ ]
𝜕Δ ]
𝜕]
𝜎
2
−
𝜕Δ ]
𝜕]
𝛼𝜎
2
= −
(𝜕Δ ]/𝜕]) 𝜎𝑑𝛾
√𝑡
,
(15)
and by inserting ] = 0 and rearranging the terms, we obtain
𝜕Δ ]
𝜕]
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨]=0
=
𝛼
− (𝜇 − 𝑟) + 𝛼𝜎
2
− 𝜎𝑑
𝛾
/√𝑡
. (16)
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Similarly, by differentiating (12) twice and inserting ] = 0
we obtain
𝜕
2
Δ ]
𝜕]2
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨]=0
=
𝜎
2
(𝜕Δ ]/𝜕]
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨]=0)
2
− (𝜇 + 𝑟) + 𝛼𝜎
2
− 𝜎𝑑
𝛾
/√𝑡
=
𝛼 (𝛼𝜎
2
− 2 (− (𝜇 − 𝑟) + 𝛼𝜎
2
− 𝜎𝑑
𝛾
/√𝑡))
(− (𝜇 − 𝑟) + 𝛼𝜎
2
− 𝜎𝑑
𝛾
/√𝑡)
3
.
(17)
Using (13) and after a few more simple manipulations, it
follows that
𝜌 − 𝜌] = −
Δ ]𝜎𝑑𝛾
√𝑡
≈ −(
𝜕Δ ]
𝜕]
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨]=0
] +
1
2
𝜕
2
Δ ]
𝜕]2
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨]=0
]2)
𝜎𝑑
𝛾
√𝑡
= ]𝛼𝛽 +
1
2
𝜕
2
Δ ]
𝜕]2
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨
󵄨]=0
𝜎𝑑
𝛾
√𝑡
]2,
(18)
where
𝛽 =
1
1 + (((𝜇 − 𝑟) /𝜎) − 𝛼𝜎)√𝑡/𝑑
𝛾
. (19)
From these expressions, the first- and second-order
effects of ] can be seen on the reduction in the rate of return.
Note that our chosen parameter space insures that 𝛽 is
positive and strictly larger than 1. The term (((𝜇 − 𝑟)/𝜎) −
𝛼𝜎)√𝑡/𝑑
𝛾
is negative and larger (see (A.3), where 𝑑
𝛾
is
negative, because 𝛾 < 50%) than −1.
An interesting feature of our first-order approximation to
the lost rate of return 𝜌 − 𝜌] is
𝜌 − 𝜌] ≈ 𝛼]𝛽. (20)
So, we can concentrate on 𝛽, which is a multiplier, to
obtain a simple, easy-to-use, first-order approximation of the
impact of administrative costs (𝛼]) on the lost rate of return.
Moreover, we note that 𝛽 tends to one as 𝑡 decreases, but
depending on the parameters and in the medium horizon of
𝑡, 𝛽 can be quite large, as becomes evident in the illustrations
presented in the next section. So, whenmeasuring the impact
of administrative costs in terms of the multiplier 𝛽, which is
larger than 1, we see that it can grow rapidly. (The second-
order effect is in the same direction.) According to (20) we
also see that for analyzing the effect of administrative costs
on the median rate of return it is necessary to fix the level of
risk factors. For illustration, Example 1 uses different values of
the probability level 𝛾; namely, 𝛾 = 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1%.
Additionally, the values of 𝑟, 𝜇, 𝜎, ], and 𝛼 also need to be
fixed, according to realistic scenarios for generic investment
products. In Section 6, parameter values for low, medium,
and high volatility scenarios are proposed and used in the
illustration of the impact of administrative costs.
5.2. First-Order Approximation of the Opportunity Cost. We
turn now to concentrate on 𝛽 and think of this multiplier as a
way of assessing the impact of administrative costs on the rate
of return lost in a feasible time horizon for investing. When
𝛽 > 1 we can formally define the opportunity cost up to first-
order as
𝐶
𝑜𝑝
= 𝛽 − 1 = −
(((𝜇 − 𝑟) /𝜎) − 𝛼𝜎)√𝑡/𝑑
𝛾
1 + (((𝜇 − 𝑟) /𝜎) − 𝛼𝜎)√𝑡/𝑑
𝛾
= −
(𝜇 − 𝑟 − 𝛼𝜎
2
)
𝜎𝑑
𝛾
/√𝑡 + (𝜇 − 𝑟 − 𝛼𝜎
2
)
.
(21)
We see that 𝐶
𝑜𝑝
depends on the risk premium (𝜇 − 𝑟) and
is increasing with the percentile 𝛾, because when 𝛾 increases
then 𝑑
𝛾
increases. Note again that since we concentrate on
downside risk, we take 𝛾 < 50%, and then 𝑑
𝛾
is negative. The
opportunity cost also depends on the particular combination
of stock exposure 𝛼 and volatility 𝜎2. Additionally, we also
see the interrelations between the opportunity costs 𝐶
𝑜𝑝
and the investment period. Thus, the most interesting result
is that the opportunity cost 𝐶
𝑜𝑝
also increases with the
investment period 𝑡 and can be extremely large when 𝑡
increases. Note that, according to Condition 2 in Appendix A
(where the parameter space is defined), the investment period
cannot be infinitely long. The maximum value for 𝑡 equals
[𝜎𝑑
𝛾
/(𝜇 − 𝑟 − 𝛼𝜎
2
)]
2 and then the opportunity cost tends to
infinity. Recall that 𝑑
𝛾
is negative.
It is our belief that the size of the opportunity cost has
perhaps been underestimated in the literature to date on the
grounds that it may dilute over time. We have shown that the
opportunity cost depends on the period of investment. This
particular result is of critical importance to pension savers,
who make long-term decisions. We show in the illustrations
that follow in reasonably long-term horizons of forty years
the opportunity cost effect can be quite substantial. Our result
provides a possible explanation as to why too often most
funds present a poor performance, especially for long-term
investment horizons.
Example 1 (continued). In our example, we consider an
investment horizon of 𝑡 = 40 and we use as a risk measure
the 10%-percentile; that is, 𝛾 = 10% and thereby 𝑑
𝛾
= −1.28.
With 𝛼 = 50% invested in stocks and no administrative costs
the rate of return is 𝜌 = 5.5%. Assuming administrative costs
of ] = 0.1%, recall that Δ ] = 2.38% and then we find that
𝜌 − 𝜌] = 0.1%, and so the reduction in the rate of return is
0.1%.
Using the Taylor expansion we have
𝜌 − 𝜌] ≈ ]𝛼𝛽, (22)
where 𝛽 = 1.9744. Thus, the first-order rate of return is
reduced by an amount that is equivalent to about twice
the administrative costs (𝛼] = 0.05%). We examined the
precision of the first-order approximation in our example, the
details of which are provided in Appendix B.
Belowwe consider the twomain reasons why administra-
tive fees constitute a burden to the investor. First, we analyze
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Table 1: Opportunity cost of administrative costs (𝛽) for selected combinations of parameter values (𝛾 = 10%, 𝑡 = 40).
Fund 𝑟 𝜇 𝜎 ] 𝛼 𝛽
Example 1 4% 8% 0.2 0.1% 50% ∈ (0%, 97.5%)∗ 1.974
Low volatility 4% 7% 0.16 0.1% 50% ∈ (0%, 113.3%)∗ 2.130
Medium volatility
Pessimistic 4% 8.5% 0.25 1.1% 50% ∈ (0%, 54.4%)∗ 1.373
Breakeven 4% 9.5% 0.25 1.1% 50% ∈ (6.9%, 70.4%)∗ 1.883
Optimistic 4% 10.5% 0.25 1.1% 50% ∈ (22.9%, 86.4%)∗ 2.996
High volatility
Pessimistic 4% 17.5% 0.75 3.1% 8.31% ∈ (0%, 18.5%)∗ 2.385
Breakeven 4% 20.5% 0.75 3.1% 10.49% ∈ (2.3%, 23.8%)∗ 3.305
Optimistic 4% 23.5% 0.75 3.1% 13.67% ∈ (7.6%, 29.2%)∗ 4.487
∗
The interval indicates the domain for parameter 𝛼 according to the conditions in Section 3.2.
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Figure 3: The plot shows 𝛽 as a function of 𝑡 (a) and 𝛼 (b) in our example. Parameters are 𝑟 = 4%, 𝜇 = 8%, 𝜎 = 20%, ] = 0.1%, 𝛾 = 10%, and
𝛼 = 50% (a) and 𝑡 = 40 (b).
the impact of administrative costs on the reduction in the
rate of return, 𝛽, as a function of time. Second, we present
the dependence of the opportunity costs on the proportion
invested in stocks. Figure 3(a), which presents 𝛽 as a function
of time, shows that while the impact increases, it is not
very great in the first few years of the investment; however,
the reduction in the rate of return increases substantially
in the long term. Figure 3(b) shows that as the percentage
invested in stocks rises, the relative reduction or the cost of
opportunity becomes smaller.
6. Illustrations
In this section we consider three possible standard scenarios
for generic investment products. We assume different sce-
narios governing the mean and variance in market returns.
(In practice, similar scenarios can be found in passive invest-
ment, active investment mutual funds, and hedge funds.)The
model and methodology used for the approximations of the
impact of administrative costs are the same for each scenario.
Parameter values for the selected scenarios are presented
in Table 1.We begin our illustrations with a standard scenario
characterized by low volatility (𝜎 = 0.16) in the returns. If
volatility is onlymoderate, themean level of stock investment
return is usually also quite low.We assume very low adminis-
trative fees in this case. Next, we examine a situation in which
expected returns are higher, as are administrative costs. We
distinguish three possible medium volatility scenarios (𝜎 =
0.25) in this case, as described in Table 1. Finally, we examine
the impact of administrative costs on investments under an
assumption of high volatility (𝜎 = 0.75). Here volatility is
much higher than in the previous scenarios and expected
returns are also higher, even though the proportion invested
in stocks in this example is considerably smaller than that
in the previous two cases. Administrative costs in this high
volatility scenario are also higher than the fees charged in the
low and medium volatility scenarios.
Our aim is to assess the impact of administrative costs
in terms of the reduction in the rate of return and to do
this we measure the multiplier 𝛽 in (20). The last column
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Figure 4: Low volatility of returns. The plot shows 𝛽 as a function of 𝑡 with 𝛼 = 50% (a) and 𝛽 as a function of 𝛼 with 𝑡 = 40 (b). Parameters
are 𝑟 = 4%, 𝜇 = 7%, 𝜎 = 16%, ] = 0.1%, and 𝛾 = 10%.
in Table 1 presents the 𝛽 values for each set of parameter
cases. It can be seen that 𝛽 > 1 in all cases, often around 2
and sometimes even much higher. The reduction in the rate
of return due to the presence of administrative costs (𝛼]) is
roughly twice (𝛽 ≈ 2) the amount of these costs in the 𝑡 = 40
year horizon for the low volatility and the medium volatility
scenarios. For optimistic medium volatility investments in
the high volatility scenario considered here, the reduction in
the rate of return is much higher than twice the amount of
administrative costs.
In the next section we discuss the evolution in 𝛽 as a
function of time and in 𝛽 as a function of 𝛼. To simplify
the presentation, we select a maximum time horizon of one
hundred years. The size of 𝛽 shows the enormous burden of
administrative costs due to the cost of opportunity.
6.1. Low Volatility. In the first scenario, we consider low
volatility as described in Table 1. Figure 4 presents the evo-
lution of 𝛽 as a function of time and 𝛽 as a function of 𝛼.
For this case we observe that the opportunity cost due to
the presence of administrative costs is well above 1 when the
proportion invested in stocks is low. Figure 4(b) shows that
if the proportion invested in stocks is less than 20%, then
𝛽 is above 4, so the opportunity cost increases more than
threefold in a time horizon of 40 years. Figure 4(a) shows that
long-term investment horizons only exacerbate the situation,
since 𝛽 keeps growing with time. It might be argued that,
in our choice of parameters for a standard, low volatility
investment of low expected returns, administrative costs are
also low and so the opportunity cost is not relevant. However,
this conclusion is drawn on relative terms and the costs can
be muchmore significant in absolute terms or in real wealth.
6.2.MediumVolatility. Wealso considered a scenario charac-
terized bymediumvolatility andmediumadministrative fees.
Figures 5, 6, and 7 present the evolution of 𝛽 as a function of
time and 𝛽 as a function of 𝛼. We first consider a pessimistic
scenario inwhich the expected returns on investment are low,
yet higher than in the case of low volatility. The impact of
administrative costs is expected to be similar to that in the
low volatility investment case, because even if volatility is now
higher, the mean return is also higher. We observe that the
impact of administrative costs (𝛽) in the medium volatility
case is now lower than it was in the low volatility case. The
impact in terms of the return lost due to administrative costs
is roughly the same in the breakeven case as in that of the
low volatility investment. But the optimistic scenario gives a
much worse result than that of the low volatility situation.
It should be noted in Figure 5(b) that the proportion of
wealth invested in stocks cannot be very large in this scenario
if we want to be able to find the risk-adjusted equivalent
in the presence of administrative costs. This means that if
𝛼 becomes larger than the values shown, we find ourselves
outside the parameter space and cannot calculate our risk-
adjusted measure of lost return.
As we proceed to the high volatility scenario, Figures 6
and 7, we observe that 𝛼 has a larger range but that the impact
of administrative costs is also much higher here than in the
pessimistic case, especially if 𝛼 is low. In the most optimistic
medium volatility scenario considered here, Figure 7, it can
be seen that the time horizon should not exceed much more
than eighty years; otherwise we can expect an enormous
increase in 𝛽 due to time persistence.
6.3. HighVolatility. Long-term investments with high volatil-
ity typically also have high expected returns and, in general,
incur high administrative fees. Figures 8, 9, and 10 present
the evolution of 𝛽 as a function of time and 𝛽 as a function of
𝛼 in the high volatility scenarios. In Table 1, where we have
initially fixed 𝑡 = 40 and a quantile probability equal to
10%, we see that for a high volatility investment we obtain
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Figure 5: Medium volatility of returns (pessimistic).The plot shows 𝛽 as a function of 𝑡with 𝛼 = 50% (a) and 𝛽 as a function of 𝛼with 𝑡 = 40
(b). Parameters are 𝑟 = 4%, 𝜇 = 8.5%, 𝜎 = 25%, ] = 1.1%, and 𝛾 = 10%.
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Figure 6: Medium volatility of returns (breakeven). The plot shows 𝛽 as a function of 𝑡 with 𝛼 = 50% (a) and 𝛽 as a function of 𝛼 with 𝑡 = 40
(b). Parameters are 𝑟 = 4%, 𝜇 = 9.5%, 𝜎 = 25%, ] = 1.1%, and 𝛾 = 10%.
the highest value of 𝛽, namely, 4.487 for the optimistic case.
In Figures 9(a) and 10(a) it can be seen that the value of 𝛽
tends to infinity as 𝑡 approaches 80 and 66, respectively,
which means that the impact of administrative costs on the
reduction in the rate of return is extreme at that boundary.
In high volatility scenarios, the parameter space is fairly
restrictive for the values of 𝛼, that is, the proportion invested
in stocks, in order to find the risk-adjusted lost return due
to administrative costs. Again our results indicate that the
impact of administrative costs, even if the excess returns
(𝜇 − 𝑟) are large, is substantial when the volatility is
high.
7. Concluding Remarks
Here we have highlighted the substantial impact adminis-
trative costs can have on investment plans with long-term
horizons. On the understanding that an analysis limited to
expected returns cannot provide a risk-adjusted evaluation of
the rate of return that is lost as a result of administrative costs,
we propose a one-stepmethod to approximate the size of their
impact. We illustrate our method with examples of realistic,
standard fund types and, in many plausible scenarios, we
often find the multiplier to be well above one, indicating that
the impact of administrative fees is much greater than their
actual size.
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Figure 7: Medium volatility of returns (optimistic). The plot shows 𝛽 as a function of 𝑡 with 𝛼 = 50% (a) and 𝛽 as a function of 𝛼 with 𝑡 = 40
(b). Parameters are 𝑟 = 4%, 𝜇 = 10.5%, 𝜎 = 25%, ] = 1.1%, and 𝛾 = 10%.
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Figure 8: High volatility of returns (pessimistic). The plot shows 𝛽 as a function of 𝑡 with 𝛼 = 50% (a) and 𝛽 as a function of 𝛼 with 𝑡 = 40
(b). Parameters are 𝑟 = 4%, 𝜇 = 17.5%, 𝜎 = 75%, ] = 3.1%, and 𝛾 = 10%.
Our findings regarding the difference in the rate of return
when introducing moderate administrative costs are much
greater than expected; and it is our belief that this accounts
for the poor performance of many common fund types.
If administrative costs are fixed and are not dependent on
performance, then they can be so highly detrimental to the
long-term return that the investor is trapped in a clearly
suboptimal investment strategy.
The simple approximation of the risk-adjusted impact can
be used to show investors the importance of administrative
costs and is a relevant contribution of this study in its own
right. The only requirements to make this estimation are the
time horizon, the volatility estimates, the excess returns, and
the proportion of wealth invested in stocks.
Finally, in highly realistic scenarios, we have shown that
the impact of administrative costs in terms of the approximate
lost rate of return is often twice the amount of these adminis-
trative fees. This is particularly disturbing for those investing
in pensions. We believe that our contribution can provide
greater insights into the analysis of administrative costs and
change perspectives regarding the information supplied by
intermediarieswhen communicating to investors the possible
impact of administrative fees. Underestimating the effects on
lost returns is potentially very high, especially if investors
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Figure 9: High volatility of returns (breakeven). The plot shows 𝛽 as a function of 𝑡 with 𝛼 = 50% (a) and 𝛽 as a function of 𝛼 with 𝑡 = 40
(b). Parameters are 𝑟 = 4%, 𝜇 = 20.5%, 𝜎 = 75%, ] = 3.1%, and 𝛾 = 10%.
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Figure 10: High volatility of returns (optimistic). The plot shows 𝛽 as a function of 𝑡 with 𝛼 = 50% (a) and 𝛽 as a function of 𝛼 with 𝑡 = 40
(b). Parameters are 𝑟 = 4%, 𝜇 = 23.5%, 𝜎 = 75%, ] = 3.1%, and 𝛾 = 10%.
erroneously believe the lost rate of return to be exactly equal
to the administrative costs.
Appendices
A. Conditions on the Parameters
Our parameter space is defined by two conditions, to which
we add one additional restriction that is required in the next
section.
Condition 1. We assume that
0 ≤ ] ≤
−𝜎𝑑
𝛾
√𝑡
. (A.1)
On one hand, we assume that administrative costs cannot
be negative; on the other, we require a maximum bound
for administrative costs in order to be able to control the
risk-return relationship. Parameter 𝑑
𝛾
, which denotes the 𝛾-
percentile of a standard normal distribution, tends to −∞
when 𝛾 tends to 0. The right-hand inequality of Condition
1 will always be satisfied if we consider a quantile probability
level 𝛾 that is sufficiently small, so in practice we can admit all
values for nonnegative administrative costs, ], provided we
work with a suitable tolerance or quantile (probability) level.
It follows from (A.1) that max(0, (((𝜇 − 𝑟) + 𝜎𝑑
𝛾
)/√𝑡)/𝜎
2
) ≤
((𝜇−𝑟−])/𝜎2) and thenwe can establish the second condition
in our parameter space.
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Figure 11: The plot shows Δ ] as a function of ] (dots) with the
first-order (solid line) and the second-order (dashed line) Taylor
expansions superimposed. Parameters are 𝑟 = 4%,𝜇 = 8%,𝜎 = 20%,
𝛾 = 10%, 𝛼 = 50%, and 𝑡 = 40.
Condition 2. Consider
max(0,
(𝜇 − 𝑟) + 𝜎𝑑
𝛾
/√𝑡
𝜎
2
) ≤ 𝛼 ≤
(𝜇 − 𝑟 − ])
𝜎
2
. (A.2)
The boundaries in (A.2) are consistent as a result of (A.1).
The lower bound for Condition 2 indicates that the median
of the wealth process increases as the proportion invested in
stocks increases. Equivalently, we want (5) to be an increasing
function of 𝛼. The upper bound in Condition 2 follows from
the fact that the quantile decreases when 𝛼 increases, so that
more wealth can be lost if a larger proportion is invested in
stocks. Thus, we impose (4) as a decreasing function of 𝛼.
Condition 2 has a consequence for the time horizon
for investors. (This bound is also useful when examining
our first-order approximation to quantify the impact of
administrative costs.) It readily follows from (A.2) that the
investment time horizon cannot be infinitely long; that is,
𝑡 ≤ [
𝜎𝑑
𝛾
(𝜇 − 𝑟 − 𝛼𝜎
2
)
]
2
. (A.3)
In order to be able to compare the quantiles of terminal
wealth for the case involving no administrative costs (] = 0)
with those for the case with administrative costs and lower 𝛼,
we need an additional condition to hold.
Condition 3. Consider
2𝛼]
𝜎
2
≤ [
(𝜇 − 𝑟 − ]) + 𝜎𝑑
𝛾
/√𝑡
𝜎
2
− 𝛼]
2
. (A.4)
B. First-Order Approximation Accuracy
In our example, we use the capital market parameters 𝑟 = 4%,
𝜇 = 8%, and 𝜎 = 20%, which are similar to those used by
other authors, including, for example, [32].
To assess the quality of the Taylor expansion, Figure 11
shows Δ ] as a function of ] with the first- and second-
order Taylor expansions superimposed. It can be seen that the
second-order Taylor expansion provides very exact approxi-
mations for the values of ] considered here, while the first-
order expansion is very exact for ] < 0.20% in our set of
parameters.
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